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Abstract We test for the existence of market discipline by shareholders of banks
with a wide range of ownership structures. Discipline by shareholders manifests
itself through monitoring banks’ level of risk as well as through influencing banks’
management actions. We find that shareholders utilize the relation between stock
returns and different types of risk measures to monitor risky banks. Shareholders
partially influence bank management by responding to decreasing stock returns with
a demand to improve loan quality. Moreover, the influence on management in small
banks is more pronounced compared to large banks.
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1 Introduction
The literature on the market discipline of banks emphasizes the significance of
monitoring and controlling for bank risk by private at-risk claimholders (Lane 1993;
Flannery 1998, 2001; Bliss and Flannery 2002). Market prices of tradable securities
issued by banks provide information that reflect the banks’ risks (Flannery and
Sorescu 1996; Hancock and Kwast 2001; Morgan and Stiroh 2001). Market prices
of these securities also affect the cost of capital and encourage prudent management
of bank risks. Market prices of debt, especially subordinated debt, and equity issued
by banks are considered two main indicators of monitoring and control (Flannery
and Sorescu 1996).
Many bank regulation proposals suggest that debt market signals might be
preferable to equity market signals (see, for example, BIS 2003). Compared to
shareholders, debtholders and bank supervisors are concerned more about the
downside risks that affect a bank’s performance than the upside potential (Furlong
and Williams 2006). However, tests of market discipline on the relation between debt
and bank risks are inconclusive (Goyal 2005). Sunderesan (2001), Kwan (2002), and
Flannery et al. (2004) argue that equity market signals are superior to debt market
signals in terms of depth and informational efficiency.
In this paper, we test the market discipline of banks in terms of the relation
between market signals and banks’ risk-taking behavior using sample of Turkish
banks. We use banks stock prices (returns) to assess the ability of shareholders to
control the risk taking by bank management. More precisely, we test whether market
indicators related to banks’ risk factors and obtained from financial statements pro-
vide sufficient influence on management’s behavior. We also show that shareholders’
monitoring and influence on management differ between small and large banks.
Small banks are owned by one dominant shareholder and a group of small investors
while ownership of large banks is more heterogeneous. Large banks are owned by
few large shareholders and many small investors. The large owners are often another
bank, a large industrial firm, or a mutual fund.
We observe that banks with concentrated ownership experience more monitoring
and control over management by shareholders. When a public firm’s ownership
is concentrated in the hands of a few large shareholders, these shareholders have
both the incentive and the power to monitor and influence the firm’s management.
Shleifer and Vishny (1986, 1997) argue that large shareholders have the incentive to
collect information and monitor management for the purposes of profit maximiza-
tion. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Himmelberg et al. (1999) emphasize that if large
shareholders are inactive then the resulting costs are borne by the same shareholders.
The downside potential of not monitoring is high, especially high for leveraged
firms like banks, saving and loans institutions, insurance companies, and securities
firms. In two other studies, Demsetz (1983, 1986) claims that a shareholder’s ability
to exercise oversight and control “must be the primary explanation for ownership
concentration.” For example, at the Mellon Bank in 1987, the Mellon family’s change
of management, with less than 50% ownership, represents a good case for the
influence of concentrated ownership on management (Haubrich and Thomson 1998).
Management’s response to a decline in banks stock prices is muted and exists
only in small banks. Further analysis also suggests that a pecking order might exist
in the management’s response. Management’s response to negative returns is to
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reduce nonperforming loans, increase liquidity, and increase capital. So, in a way
management uses the most readily available measures first, then considers other time
consuming and costly measures. Large banks have highly sophisticated instruments
in their balance sheets, thus it might not be possible for shareholders to assess the
riskiness of various assets. Therefore, no matter how large the ownership share,
investors might be unable to control management given the proportion of complex
and opaque financial instruments relative to the size of the bank. Flannery et al.
(2004) show that market investors have good information about smaller banks (listed
on Nasdaq) compared with size-matched firms. Their findings suggest that bank
stock-price data are at least as good, and in the case of smaller banking firms, perhaps
even better than those of nonfinancial firms at reflecting firm-specific information.
Shareholders’ influence on risk taking declines as bank size increases. Moreover,
they show that the introduction of bank regulatory and deposit insurance agencies
are only effective in improving the capital adequacy ratio of small banks.
We use data on the Turkish banking industry to test for the existence of market
discipline. With its developed banks and the majority of them traded on the stock
exchange, the Turkish banking industry provides a good test of market discipline
by shareholders. The existence of concentrated ownership (family blockholders and
large shareholders) in the majority of the publicly traded banks in Turkey and weak
shareholder protection laws (Hacimahmutoglu 2007) provide a sufficiently testable
environment for observing shareholders’ influence on management.
Moreover, Turkey has some interesting bank ownership structures; financial
returns do not motivate all the shareholders of these banks. For example, a political
party is a large shareholder in one of the largest private banks.1 In another case,
government is the largest shareholder in a publicly traded bank. Employees’ pension
funds also own significant shares in banks, motivated by job security and benefits
to employees. In such a diverse ownership structure, the evidence shows that
shareholders are differentiated by their sensitivity to negative stock returns and
different measures of risk. In addition, the relationship between management and
shareholder can be different in small banks than in large banks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief
summary of the related literature on market discipline. Section 3 discusses the model
and the data used by shareholders in monitoring and influencing banks. We interpret
the estimation results in Section 4. The paper concludes with Section 5.
2 Literature review
Lane (1993) defines market discipline in the context of financial markets as “provid-
ing signals that lead borrowers (i.e., banks) to behave in a manner consistent with
their solvency.” This definition leads to the two components of market discipline
defined by Bliss and Flannery (2002): “Monitoring” refers to market participants’
1A political party that is regarded as social-democratic and is a member of the Socialist International,
the worldwide organization of social-democratic, socialist, and labor parties owns 28.1% of I˙s¸bank.
In the empirical analysis, we exclude banks that might have shareholders with different motivations
than stock value maximization as a robustness check of our findings.
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incentives and ability to understand changes in a firm’s condition and incorporate
their opinions into the firm’s stock and debt prices. “Influence” refers to the process
by which the changes in market participants’ behaviors induce the managers to
respond to adverse changes in the banks’ financial conditions.
A large volume of literature exists on the different forms of market discipline
on banks. Early literature focuses on the effects of subordinated debt and the
effectiveness of depositors in limiting risk taking by bank management. However,
the literature on the disciplining role of shareholders remains relatively small.
Docking et al. (1997) provide evidence that loan-loss-reserve announcements have
a significant correlation with the negative returns of U.S. bank shares. Return on
equity is sensitive to other factors that indicate an increase in the bank’s riskiness.
Billet et al. (1998) document evidence that a decline in equity prices after Moody’s
debt-rating downgrades represent discrete changes in bank risk. They show that
Moody’s debt-rating downgrades increase future uninsured debt-financing costs of
banks and, hence, have a negative effect on equity prices.
Another source for the negative response of market prices is the announcement
of supervisory reviews for remedial action in order to avoid failure as shown by
Jordan et al. (2000). The release of supervisory information provides significant
information to the market resulting in a 5% decline in stock prices on average.
According to Krainer and Lopez (2004), market variables such as equity returns
and probabilities of default are useful indicators that supervisors use to assess the
soundness of bank holding companies (BHCs). They conclude that equity-based
indicators are predictors in BOPEC downgrades and improve the performance of
early warning systems.2 More recently, Cannata and Quagliariello (2005) examine
the behavior of four commonly used equity-based indicators on Italian banks listed
on the Milan Stock Exchange between 1995 and 2002: equity prices, daily returns,
volatility, and distance to default. They find that equity-based variables confirm
supervisory ratings assigned by the Bank of Italy’s PATROL ratings that suggest
that the use of market signals for bank monitoring are appropriate.3 Distinguin
et al. (2006) examine downgrade and upgrade events for 64 European banks for
the period of 1995–2002 and find that stock market prices, especially the difference
between market prices and the 216-day moving average, significantly predict future
financial distress for banks. They suggest that stock market prices might be effective
in disciplining banks.
While evidence supports close monitoring of bank riskiness by shareholders, the
ability of the shareholders to sway bank management from disproportional risk
taking is not well established. As argued by Bliss and Flannery (2002), negative
market signals might only be suggestions to management to make changes. Ex-
amining quarterly excess returns during 1986–1997 for large U.S. BHCs, they find
weak evidence of stockholders’ influence on managerial actions. Among multiple
measures of market signals, such as a number of managerial action variables and
various lags between signal and potential action, they find that only increased
dividend payments and changes in uninsured liabilities of BHCs are evidence of
2BOPEC: Bank subsidiaries, Other non-bank subsidiaries, Parent company, Earnings and Capital
adequacy.
3PATROL: Capital adequacy, Profitability, Credit risk, Management and Liquidity.
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influence by stockholders. However, Nier and Baumann (2006) show that banks’
disclosures to shareholders limit their default risk by increasing capital ratios, which
suggest market influence. Event studies such as managerial terminations also indicate
stockholders’ influence. For example, Parrinoa et al. (2003) show that stockholders
can vote out management and that poor firm performance increases the likelihood
of managerial turnover. Cihak et al. (2011) find that executives are more likely
to be dismissed if their bank is risky and incurs losses, which suggests discipline
from shareholders. Nevertheless, the market discipline paradigm requires timely and
accurate assessment of banks’ financial conditions. Hence, managerial turnover can
be too late for avoiding bank failure.
Other studies consider the possible effectiveness of total risk, portfolio beta,
and idiosyncratic risk as informative signals for market participants. For example,
Hall et al. (2002) show that shareholders’ valuation of credit risk is about the
same as the regulators’ valuation for BHCs. Moreover, their results indicate that
the variables representing interest-rate risk, credit risk, liquidity risk, off-balance
sheet risk, and earnings do fairly well in explaining the variance in the market
measures of risk. Nikolova (2003), Kwan (2004), Krainer and Lopez (2004) and
Gropp et al. (2006) combine equity and debt-market indicators by constructing
implied asset volatility estimates of banks and, using either set of indicators, show
that the combined indicators outperform the models that explain bank risks. Curry
et al. (2008) present evidence that excess returns and the standard deviation of
quarterly returns explain BOPEC rating upgrades, hereby establishing the conditions
for shareholder discipline to be effective.
While market discipline of banks is documented for developed financial markets,
it is not sufficiently studied in emerging markets. Caprio and Honohan (2004) pro-
vide evidence from emerging markets that the probability of stock market discipline
increases as the listed banks’ assets increase as a share of total banking assets.
However, they find no evidence for the influencing ability of shareholders on bank
management.
3 The models and the data
3.1 Models of shareholder monitoring and influence
We estimate the responsiveness of shareholders to bank risk and their ability to
influence management decisions on bank risk using two empirical models. Bliss and
Flannery (2002) define the interaction between shareholders and bank management
as market discipline that demonstrates the investors’ ability to evaluate the banks’
financial condition and the responsiveness of the bank’s management to the in-
vestors’ stock-return assessment.
First, we consider estimating the shareholders’ assessment of the riskiness of
publicly traded banks based on the banks’ financial reports. Stock-price changes are
readily available to shareholders; and, with the announcements of the bank financial
indicators such as the risk ratios, shareholders react to the news by adjusting their
holdings of bank shares. Thus, shareholders’ bank-risk monitoring behavior exists
if there is a significant relation between equity returns and risk measures obtained
from the financial statements of banks.
192 J Financ Serv Res (2012) 42:187–205
Second, we model the shareholders’ effectiveness in modifying management risk-
taking behavior. While positive returns might not necessarily result in any man-
agement action, negative returns should prompt bank management to take action
to adjust the risk structure of the bank. However, the extent of the influence of
shareholders portfolio decisions on managerial actions is not observable. To estimate
the extent of the influence of shareholders on bank management, we present a model
where negative returns are regressed on the change in the sign of the risk parameters
from the balance sheets after controlling for other factors.
Model I: shareholders’ bank risk monitoring behavior In the first model, we esti-
mate the shareholders’ abilities to monitor bank risks from the financial statement
data. Market responses represent shareholders’ assessments of bank risk taking,
and stock prices signal shareholders to follow the market’s valuation of the bank.
Banks stock prices and returns fluctuate according to the risks taken by banks after
controlling for other bank specific variables and macroeconomic conditions. The
monitoring model is as follows:
Yit = αi + φYit−1 +
4∑
j=1
γ jBank Riskijt−1 +
3∑
k=1
θk Xikt−1 + ψ Zt−1 + eit (1)
where Yit is the stock return for bank i at the quarter t and eit is the error term.
The Yt−1 is the lagged values of stock returns. We compute the stock returns as the
log difference in the closing price of the stock over the period t and t-1.4 In Eq. 1,
the variable Bank Risk represents the CAMEL ratios obtained from the banks’
financial statements: capitalization (Capital/Assets), asset quality (Nonperforming
Loans/Assets), managerial performance (Operational Ef f iciency), and liquidity (Liq-
uid Assets/Asset).5 We use efficiency instead of return on asset as a proxy for
management performance to avoid any causality problem between stock and asset
returns. The efficiency score would be independent of the banks’ risk taking because
it only shows how resources are allocated. Bank capitalization, liquidity, earnings,
and operational efficiency are expected to have a positive relation to equity returns.
An increase in the nonperforming loans-to-assets ratio indicates a low return for the
bank.
We have two sets of control variables: Xik denotes control variables that are
related to other bank characteristics that might affect stock returns. These are
leverage ratio (Total Deposits/Assets), franchise value (Market-to-Book), and the
trading volume of the banking firm in the capital market (Total Trading Volume
(in logs)). The Z is used to control the changes in the macroeconomic conditions. It
is represented by the quarterly changes in the current gross domestic product (GDP
4We also estimate the model using excess returns. Excess returns are calculated by taking the
difference between the stock return of a bank at the closing date and the quarterly average overnight
lending rate. Because our results are robust with excess returns, we only report the findings with raw
returns. Estimations with excess returns can be provided on request.
5Operational efficiency scores are calculated using a Cobb–Douglas frontier (Batesse and Coelli
1995). The estimated scores show the efficiency in providing loans for given deposits and the labor
force.
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Growth), and it is hypothesized that an increase in gross domestic product increases
stock returns.
Model II: shareholders’ inf luence on management Shareholders expect manage-
ment action to correct disproportionate risk taking. Shareholders’ influence on bank
management exists if rational managers become aware of declining stock prices and
take action to mitigate the increase in bank-risk factors. Therefore, in the influence
model, bank risk is expected to decrease in the periods following negative stock
returns defined by one of the three risk indicators; namely, increases in the capital-to-
asset ratio ((K/A) > 0), liquid assets-to-asset ratio ((L/A) > 0), or a decrease in
the nonperforming loans-to-assets ratio ((N PL/A) < 0).6 We hypothesize that the
impact of stock returns on managerial risk-taking behavior is asymmetric. We assume
that only negative market signals indicate that investors might want management
to make changes, whereas positive signals generally do not suggest that change is
desired. Hence, it is expected that managers might respond to improve their banks’
capitalization, liquidity, and asset quality when stock returns decline.7
To estimate the extent of shareholders’ influence on decisions about the compo-
sition of the balance sheet by bank management, we model the effect of the market-
price indicators on the change in bank-risk factors by using the following logit model:
Inf luenceit = αi + φ Yit−1 +
2∑
k=1
θ jXikt + ψ Zt + eit (2)
where eit is the error term. The Inf luenceit is a binary variable that equals one if bank
i decreases its risk (i.e., reduces its nonperforming loans-to-assets ratio or increases
its capital-to assets and liquid assets-to-assets ratios) and zero if bank i increases its
risk (i.e., increases its nonperforming loans-to-assets ratio or decreases its capital-to-
assets ratio and its liquid assets-to-asset ratio). The Inf luenceit measures whether
expected management action is taken or not. The Yit−1 denotes negative stock
returns for bank i at quarter t-1. We hypothesize that negative stock returns contain
components that can be avoided by managerial decisions. Hence, negative stock
returns increase the probability of managers’ responses, and their decisions should
result in decreases in the bank’s specific risks or in decreases in moral hazard
(Demsetz et al 1996; Keeley 2000). Since, the sample in the influence model is limited
to those quarters where lagged stock return was negative the number of observations
in the empirical analysis of influence model will be smaller relative to monitoring
model (see Table 3).
In Eq. 2, control variables (Xik) are bank size (Assets (in logs)) and franchise
value (Market-to-Book). Although we have no a priori expectation about the relation
between the variable Inf luenceit and the size of the bank, increases in bank-franchise
value are expected to reduce moral hazard. The Z denotes a dummy variable
(BRSA Dummy) to control the changes in bank management in Turkey after
6 denotes change per unit of time.
7A similar approach on the effect of shareholder influence is also provided by Bliss and Flannery
(2002) where equity returns prompt managerial action to increase the market value of the bank.
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the introduction of the newly established banking regulatory agency, the Banking
Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA). BRSA Dummy takes a value of zero
from the beginning of the estimation period until the fourth quarter of 2000 and a
value of one starting in the fourth quarter of 2000 until the third quarter of 2006.8
3.2 Data
We use quarterly data over the period of 1997:4–2006:3. Financial statements for each
publicly traded bank come from the Banking Association of Turkey. The number of
sample banks varies due to closures and acquisitions. In 1997, there were 12 publicly
traded deposit banks in the dataset. During the sample period, shares of five new
banks started trading on the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) and four banks were
closed by the State Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF).9 Once a bank is taken over
by the SDIF, shares of that bank are no longer traded on the ISE.10 Therefore,
the dataset is an unbalanced panel of 10 to 16 banks. All bank data from financial
statements are transformed into dollars because of the high depreciation in the value
of the Turkish Lira until 2005. The banks included in the dataset account for about
65% of the assets of the banking industry.
Macroeconomic data come from the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey.
Daily bank equity prices and the ISE 100 Index come from DataStream. All stock
price data are adjusted for rights’ offerings, stock splits, and dividend payments.
In Table 1, we provide trading and ownership data of the banks included in the
dataset. In addition, we include initial public offering dates, type of management,
and the date of change in management. During the time period studied, large
shareholders remained active in the management of banks until 2005. Since then,
many banks in the Turkish banking industry have undergone a change in ownership
and management because foreign ownership has increased. By the end of 2006,
seven publicly traded banks out of 16 were managed by professional management
teams. The banking system consists of five large banks with relatively heterogeneous
ownership and the remaining small banks with concentrated ownership. The average
size of the large banks over the sample period is $11.7 billion while the average size
of small banks is $1.5 billion.
In Table 2, we present the summary statistics of all variables that are used in the
monitoring and influencing models. During the sample period of 1997:4 to 2006:3,
8Until June 23, 1999, the Treasury Undersecretariat and the Central Bank of Republic of Turkey
had been the two main regulatory and supervisory bodies in the banking sector in Turkey. Since
then, the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency, with financial and administrative autonomy,
exercises its supervisory authority on a direct and ongoing basis in terms of legal considerations and
financial soundness. All banks’ financial statements are audited by external auditors in accordance
with internationally accepted principles of accounting. See Steinherr et al. (2004) for a review of
banking supervision in Turkey.
9The Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF) was established in 1983 to insure savings deposits in
banks. Initially, SDIF was administrated by the Central Bank of Turkey. In 1994, the Fund’s duties
were expanded and the SDIF was charged in strengthening and restructuring the financial condition
of banks when necessary. Since 2000, SDIF has being administered and represented by BRSA.
10SDIF took control of four banks between December 1999 and November 2001.
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Table 3 Distribution of the
sign of influence variables
†Total number of observations
is different due to use of
lagged values
Stock return (Yt−1) N
Positive (Y+) Negative (Y−)
(K/A) > 0 91 89 180
(K/A) < 0 102 77 179
N† 193 166 359
(LA/A) > 0 91 108 199
(LA/A) < 0 109 71 180
N 200 179 379
(N PL/A) < 0 143 128 271
(N PL/A) > 0 57 51 108
N 200 179 379
average daily stock returns per quarters are 0.5% for all banks, almost zero for small
banks and 1.2% for large banks. Moreover, quarterly log values of returns are highly
volatile for the full sample and subsamples of large and small banks. For all banks, the
average quarterly negative (positive) returns are 32.6 (29.6) percent with standard
deviations of 27.8 (23.0) percent.
Significant variation exists among banks. In terms of bank characteristics, small
banks are less well capitalized compared to large banks but have less nonperforming
loans. The profitability of small banks is on average below zero during the sample
period. Large banks’ capital ratios are above the minimum required level yet they
are highly profitable. The calculated average score for operational efficiency at 0.545
is low compared to U.S. and European banks.11 However, efficiency scores have
improved over time.
The liquidity of large banks is, on average, five percentage points higher than
for small banks during the sample period. This difference might be interpreted as
evidence of why small banks must be monitored more closely than large banks. While
small banks have more funding from depositors as compared to large banks, their
deposits-to-asset ratio varies significantly with a standard deviation almost five times
(6.6% for large banks versus 32.1% for small banks) the standard deviation of large
banks. In terms of total trading volume, trading of small banks shares is highly active
and close to the trading levels of large banks shares.
Table 3 summarizes the quarterly movements of stock returns and possible
managerial actions that the influence model hypothesizes. More precisely, we re-
port positive/negative influence (change in capital-to-asset, liquid assets-to-assets,
and nonperforming loans-to-assets ratios) and lagged stock-return sign counts. For
example, there are 89 (77) observations of increases (decreases) in the capital ratio
following a negative quarterly stock return. Liquid assets increase (decrease) in 108
(71) out of 179 quarters following a negative return. Following a negative quarterly
stock return in 128 out of 179 quarters, banks reduce their nonperforming loans. In
the next section, we present the robust relation between negative stock returns and
risk reducing managerial actions that results in decreasing nonperforming loans.
11For example, see Casu and Molyneux (2003) on European Union banks and Berger and Mester
(1997) on U.S. banks.
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4 Estimation results
In Tables 4, 5, and 6, we present the results from using the bank monitoring and
influence models. First, we examine the monitoring behavior of shareholders by
using returns on bank stocks. Financial ratios such as nonperforming loans to total
assets, capital-to-total assets, liquid assets to total assets, and operational efficiency
are used to determine the existence and effectiveness of shareholder monitoring.
Shareholders follow these ratios to assess the riskiness of their investments. Changes
in these risk indicators can affect the rate of return to shareholders. This relation
is also examined for subsamples of small and large banks. There is a difference
in the ownership structure between large and small banks. As discussed before,
large banks in Turkey are owned by a few large shareholders; such as, a foreign
bank, an industrial holding company or another institution, plus a large number
of small shareholders. Ownership in small banks is more concentrated, with more
than two-thirds of the shares owned by one large industrial holding company and the
remainder by small investors.12
Second, we present evidence on the influence of the shareholders on management
that results in adjustments to bank-risk indicators. Shareholder influence depends
on the existence of a relation between the financial ratios and adverse stock returns.
This relation is also examined for small and large banks to understand how influence
might differ by type of bank.
4.1 Monitoring
We test for the existence of monitoring by shareholders by regressing bank-risk
variables on stock returns. Bank-risk variables obtained from the financial state-
ments of banks, bank-specific control variables, and an indicator of general economic
conditions are regressed on stock returns. Table 4 presents the fixed-effect estimation
results of the monitoring model described in Eq. 1. The same monitoring model is
regressed for subsamples of large and small publicly traded banks as well as for all
banks.
As seen in Table 4, banks’ operational efficiency and liquidity are the two
significant risk indicators monitored by shareholders for all banks. Moreover, the
reduction in the liquidity risk or risk of not having sufficient cash or borrowing
capacity to meet deposit withdrawals increases significantly the stock returns of both
small and large banks. However, efficiency is only significant for small banks. As
presented in Table 2, small banks are, on average, less efficient than large banks.
Because managerial inefficiency can typically reflect the excessive use of or payment
for branches, labor, or the excessive deposit interest cost, the cost of reorganizing a
bank even a small scale bank can be very high. Similar to the finding by Wheelock
and Wilson (2000) for U.S. banks, our findings suggest that a small bank that can
control its cost or improve efficiency signals vigilant management. Capital ratio
and nonperforming loans have the predicted sign but are insignificant for the full
sample of banks as well as both subsamples. For small banks, the coefficient for
nonperforming loans has the wrong sign but is not significant. These results indicate
12Three of the small banks have foreign majority shareholders as of 2005 (Table 2).
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Table 4 This table presents fixed effect estimates of the monitoring model for the the period of
1997:4 and 2006:3:
Yit = αi + φYit−1 +
4∑
j=1
γ j Bank Riskijt−1 +
3∑
k=1
θk Xikt−1 + ψ Zt−1 + eit
where Yit denotes stock return from quarter t − 1 to t for bank i. Bank Riskit−1 denotes lagged values
of nonperforming loans-to-assets, capital-to-assets, operational efficiency, and liquid assets-to-assets.
Xit−1 denotes lagged values of three bank specific control variables for bank i: Total Deposits-to-
Assets, Trading Volume and Market-to-Book value of the bank. Zt−1 denotes macroeconomic control
variable: lagged values of GDP growth. t-statistics are in parentheses
All Small Large
Stock returnt−1 −0.401*** −0.421*** −0.400***
(−7.881) (−6.322) (−4.858)
Bank risk variablest−1
Nonperforming loans/assets −0.473 4.517 −1.856
(−0.384) (1.221) (−1.427)
Capital/assets 0.919 0.876 1.565
(1.287) (0.711) (1.580)
Operational efficiency 0.343*** 0.467*** 0.187
(4.161) (3.872) (1.540)
Liquid assets/assets 1.060*** 1.012*** 1.269***
(6.771) (4.363) (5.372)
Control variables (Xit−1)
Total deposits/assets 0.519* 0.352 0.827
(1.913) (0.975) (1.327)
Total trading volume (in logs) 0.080*** 0.083*** 0.143***
(4.403) (3.696) (3.127)
Market-to-Book 0.098*** 0.123*** 0.091***
(6.226) (4.288) (4.173)
Macroeconomic variable (Zt−1)
GDP growth −2.161*** −2.171*** −2.309***
(−6.163) (−4.674) (−3.893)
Adj. R-squared 0.295 0.290 0.316
F statistics 20.833 12.514 9.808
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of observations 352 209 143
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively
that share prices as market variables respond to changes in some, but not all, bank-
risk indicators. Among the control variables, trade volume and market-to-book value
have positive and significant impacts on stock returns as expected.
4.2 Influence
As emphasized by Bliss and Flannery (2002), shareholders must be able to influence
banks’ risk-taking behavior in order to exercise market discipline. However, share-
holders might prefer a riskier investment strategy as long as the expected return
compensates them for the additional risk. Hence, their incentives to discipline banks
are not as obvious as other security holders such as bondholders. Nevertheless, due
to the increasing complexity of banking activities and the inability of supervisors
to monitor and control them using standard risk measures; shareholders, especially
major shareholders, seem to be the natural candidates for effective market discipline.
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Table 5 The effect of market price indicator on the change in bank-risk factors is using the following
logit model (influence model):
Inf luenceit = αi + φ Yi,t−1 +
2∑
j=1
θ jXijt + ψ Zt + eit.
Inf luenceit is one if quarterly changes in capital-to-assets, and quarterly changes in liquid
assets-to-assets ratios are positive. Also, Inf luenceit is one if quarterly changes in nonperforming
loans-to-assets ratio is negative. Otherwise, Inf luenceit is zero. Yit−1 denotes lagged values of
negative stock returns for bank i. Xit denotes the two bank specific control variables: bank size
(Assets (in logs)) and franchise value of the bank (Market-to-Book). Zt denotes the dummy variable
(BRSA Dummy) to identify the periods with new independent regulatory and supervisory agency
for banking in Turkey. Notes:  denotes change over time. K/A is capital-to-asset ratio, LA/A
is liquid asset-to-asset ratio and N PL/A is non-performing loans-to-asset ratio. z-values are in
parentheses
Inf luenceit = 1 when
Increase Decrease
Capital/assets Liquid assets/assets Nonperforming loans/assets
((K/A) > 0) ((LA/A) > 0) ((N PL/A) < 0)
Stock returnt−1 0.097 −0.249 1.627***
(0.164) (−0.437) (2.690)
Control variables (Xit, Zt)
Assets (in logs) −0.038* 0.039** 0.103***
(−1.881) (2.121) (4.711)
Market-to-Book 0.393*** −0.146 −0.248*
(2.575) (−1.158) (−1.829)
BRSA dummy 0.638* −0.516 −0.611
(1.752) (−1.497) (−1.564)
Log likelihood −110.40 −118.47 −100.35
N with Dependent Variable = 0 77 71 51
N with Dependent Variable = 1 89 107 127
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively
To test for the existence of influence by shareholders on management, we use
logistic regressions. Any evidence of influence on management would manifest itself
in changes in key financial ratios in response to share prices or returns. While
it is possible to have a long list of management action that includes asset sales,
workforce reduction etc., we limit our estimates to three key risk indicators where
the dependent variables are the probability of a change in the capital adequacy
ratio, the liquidity ratio, and the nonperforming loans-to-asset ratio. These are the
most commonly used policy actions by management within a short period of time
in response to lower returns to shareholders. In particular, the effect of negative
stock returns, and their association with increasing risk indicators, would compel
management to take action. We control for other factors such as size, franchise value,
and the effect of bank regulation in the influence model as described in Eq. 2.
The estimated equations of influence are reported in Table 5. After controlling for
other factors, we find a significant relation between stock returns and nonperforming
loans. The coefficient of stock returns is significant at the 1% level. The coefficients
of capital asset and liquidity equations are not significant. Because it is costly to
increase capital, management does not consider increasing the capital ratio as a
measure to reduce risk. So, the response of managers to negative stock returns seems
to be ineffective on improving the bank’s capitalization.
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Table 6 Influence model estimates for small versus large banks. z-values are in parentheses
Small banks Large banks
Dependent variable: (K/A) > 0
Stock returnt−1 −0.295 0.953
(−0.363) (0.964)
Log likelihood −62.12 −41.81
N with Dependent Variable=0 51 26
N with Dependent Variable=1 51 38
Dependent variable: (LA/A) > 0
Stock return t−1 −0.435 0.173
(−0.608) (0.179)
Log likelihood −73.88 −43.70
N with Dependent Variable=0 43 28
N with Dependent Variable=1 71 36
Dependent variable: (N PL/A) < 0
Stock returnt−1 1.880** 1.157
(2.492) (1.081)
Log likelihood −62.51 −36.38
N with Dependent Variable=0 31 20
N with Dependent Variable=1 83 44
** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level
Furthermore, increasing, say Tier I capital would have the effect of further
reducing the rate of return on stocks. The coefficient of returns in the liquidity
equation is also not significant and indicates the difficulties and costs involved in
changing the asset composition. So, reducing non-operating loans either by turning
them over to asset management companies or writing them off remains the only
management actions when shareholders experience negative stock returns. Although
banks also improve their liquidity when shareholders have negative returns in the last
period, this response is not significant.
We also estimate the market influence model for large and small bank subsamples
to test for any differences in the responses to negative returns by different types
of banks. We present the estimation results of the market influence model for the
subsets of large and small banks in Table 6.13 Similar to the estimates for all banks,
we find shareholder influence to only be effective for nonperforming loans of small
banks. The effect on large banks is not significant.
4.3 Robustness check
Some banks have non-standard ownership structures in Turkey.14 The largest bank
by asset size, I˙s¸bank, is partly owned by a political party and an employees’ pension
fund. S¸ekerbank is one-third owned by an employees’ pension fund, one-third by
a foreign company, and one-third is publicly traded. In another case, government
is the largest shareholder in Vakıfbank. As a robustness check, we exclude these
13We did not report the results of the full models in the paper in order to save space. They are
available on request.
14Section 1 discusses bank ownership by different types of institutions.
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Table 7 Fixed effect estimates of the monitoring and influence models excluding selected banks
(I˙s¸bank, Vakıfbank and S¸ekerbank) with different ownership structure. †Negative stock returns are
used in the influence model. t-statistics and z-statistics are in parentheses
Monitoring Influence model
model (K/A) > 0 (LA/A) > 0 (N PL/A) < 0
Stock return† −0.441*** −0.394 −1.156** 1.411***
(−8.000) (−0.765) (−2.249) (2.737)
Nonperforming loans/assets −1.531
(−1.130)
Capital/assets 1.792**
(2.104)
Operational efficiency 0.355***
(4.044)
Liquid assets/assets 1.179***
(6.748)
Total deposits/assets 0.757***
(2.654)
Total trading volume 0.097***
(4.298)
GDP growth −2.250***
(−5.942)
Market-to-Book 0.133*** 0.217** −0.044 −0.080
(6.861) (1.841) (−0.393) (−0.626)
Assets (in logs) −0.030 0.013 0.083***
(−1.614) (0.736) (4.114)
BRSA dummy 0.393 −0.462 −0.498
(1.185) (−1.491) (−1.389)
N 279 256 271 271
∗∗∗ and ∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively
three banks that might have shareholders with different motivations than stock value
maximization and examine monitoring and influence with the remaining banks. As
seen in the first column of Table 7, the results do not change significantly from the
previous results reported in Table 4. However, the capital-to-assets ratio becomes
a significant factor in understanding the riskiness of a bank. Moreover, shareholders
are able to influence the bank management to increase the liquidity level, which is the
second line of action for managements in reducing risk. Once banks with state and
quasi-state ownership are removed from the sample the evidence for shareholder
influence becomes stronger. Therefore, we observe that shareholders’ influence in
privately-owned banks is more evident where objectives of the owners is consistent
with value maximization. In these cases management is compelled to take more
fundamental measures to improve return to shareholders.
5 Concluding remarks
We test for the existence of banks’ market discipline differentiated by type of bank.
Shareholder discipline manifests itself in the form of monitoring banks’ risk as well
as influencing banks’ management actions to limit risk taking.
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Shareholder returns have a significant relation to bank efficiency and liquidity.
Shareholders who invest in small banks as part of a portfolio are sensitive to risk
factors such as bank efficiency and liquidity as well as other factors including trading
volume and franchise value. While this is true for small banks, bank efficiency is
not a key concern for shareholders in the case of large banks. However, excluding
some banks where the dominant shareholders might be motivated by different rent-
seeking objectives improves the significance of capital ratio, bank efficiency, and
liquidity.
Shareholders, observing increased bank risk, expect management measures to
reduce risk to acceptable levels that results in the reallocation of the bank’s assets.
However, the bank incurs costs while reallocating funds from risky assets to less
risky assets. So, bank management tries to change the composition of the assets at
minimum cost. We find evidence that there is a strong relation between negative
returns to shareholders and the decline in nonperforming loans. This relation implies
that management initiates a less costly adjustment to the bank’s asset structure
by reducing exposure to nonperforming loans. Exclusion of special-interest banks
further strengthens the influence of shareholders by adding the liquidity ratio as a
significant factor that bank management attempts to adjust.
The period covered in the estimations includes two severe financial crises: one in
1997 that affected emerging financial markets and the crisis that occurred in Turkey
in 2001. These two crises provide sufficient evidence of management measures to
protect franchise value. After experiencing two major crises and a number of super-
visory changes, the Turkish banking industry demonstrates evidence of shareholder
market discipline. The dominance of large shareholders limits banks’ risk-taking
behavior, particularly that of small banks. This limitation implies that the problems
faced by the Turkish banking industry in the past are related to monetary and
supervisory policies pursued by the government (Ertugrul and Yeldan 2003).
While we demonstrate the extent of the shareholders’ influence on management
measures, it should be remembered that the results are based on a sample of banks
from one country. However, existence of a range of ownership structures enables us
to better understand the effectiveness of different ownership types on management’s
risk control. The robustness of the results can be further tested with a cross-country
context. Finally, including characteristics of different forms of ownership explicitly
in the model would provide a better understanding of the role of shareholders in the
determination of the risk-taking behavior of bank managers.
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